The case of Chile is very special because it is the only TPP negotiating country that already has trade agreements in force with each of the other trade partners. Chile can only profit marginally from the TPP because of its openness and it does not or should not have incentives to make concessions in sensitive areas like Intellectual Property, Digital Rights and Financial Transactions while other countries have strong incentives to make such concessions.

The context described above puts Chile in a particularly difficult position in the negotiating process, the result to which some of the countries aspire, ends up pushing the negotiation far beyond what Chile are willing to accept, because of its own negotiating limits established in other agreements and introduces limitations to policies like health, innovation, culture, or capital movements.

On the other hand, at least until now, the attempts to recognize the diversity of interests among TPP partners in a way that considers the creation of flexibilities that address the diversity of situations, as historically recognized in the multilateral negotiations conducted by the WTO, are unknown. In the case of Chile, the best possible bargain is the assurance that there will be no regression from what was granted in past negotiations, otherwise, it would mean paying twice for the same benefit. The lack of clarity over the costs and benefits of the TPP negotiation is one of the weakest points of this process.

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